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During the past decades, many governments in Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) have offered significant incentives in order to attract foreign direct 
investments (FDI), motivated by expectations on possible spillover benefits. In this 
paper we try to analyse the effects generated by foreign firms on domestic firms’ 
productivity in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland. In particular, we try to answer the 
following research questions: 1) Are there any spillover effects of FDI, and if so, are 
they positive or negative? 2) Are spillover effects more likely to occur within or across 
sectors? 3) Are all types of foreign firms able to generate positive spillovers for 
domestic firms? In order to answer these questions we estimate a firm level database 
using random effect models. We control for selection bias and endogeneity by adopting 
the semiparametric estimation method suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996). Finally, 
we test whether intra and inter-sectoral spillovers depend on host country’s social 
capabilities and absorptive capacity. We found interesting results. On average, 
spillovers are more likely to accrue to the more productive firms. Less productive firms, 
in fact, are able to reap some externalities only when they are located in the capital 
regions.  Finally, we found that, on average, high tech foreign firms tend to generate 
positive externalities for domestic firms only in the less developed countries. Low tech 
foreign firms generate both vertical and horizontal spillovers, which are exploited mail 
by more productive firms. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the past decades, many governments in Central and Eastern European Countries 
(CEECs) have offered significant incentives in order to attract foreign direct 
investments (FDI), motivated by expectations on possible spillover benefits. In this 
paper we try to analyse the effects generated by foreign firms on domestic firms’ 
productivity in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland. In particular, we try to answer the 
following research questions: 1) Are there any spillover effects of FDI, and if so, are 
they positive or negative? 2) Are spillover effects more likely to occur within or across 
sectors? 3) Are all types of foreign firms able to generate positive spillovers for 
domestic firms? 
 
This work relates on a large body of theoretical and empirical literature.  From a 
theoretical point of view, the main hypotheses are, first, that multinational enterprises 
rely on intangible assets, such as a superior technology in order to be internationally 
competitive (Markusen, 1995); secondly, multinational enterprises transfer know-how 
and technology to their foreign affiliates and, thirdly, that technology brought by 
foreign firms, being partly a public good, spills over the host economy through several 
channels. The latter are linked to the way how domestic firms react to the entrance of a 
foreign firm in their own markets. Additional competition pushes for efficiency 
improvements, which become necessary if firms want to maintain their market shares. 
Domestic firms may learn from foreign companies about new products, production 
techniques and organization skills, thus increasing their performance.
1 This transfer of 
benefits may occur either voluntarily, through input output linkages between domestic 
and foreign firms, or involuntarily through competition, imitation and training 
(Blomstrom et al. 2001). Generally speaking, the former tend to encourage vertical 
flows of generic knowledge, leading to inter-industry spillovers, while the second 
involve horizontal flows of specific knowledge, yielding to intra-industry spillovers. 
Needless to say, in both cases domestic firms become more productive and efficient, 
thus fostering local industrial development as suggested by several economists from 
                                                 
1 Needless to say, foreign firms may also generate negative effects for domestic firms, such as tougher 
competition in the final markets as well as in the source - i.e. labour – ones. A common belief, however, 
is that positive effects outweigh negative ones (UNCTAD, 2001).   3
Hirschman (1954) and Helpman, (1984), to Rodriguez-Clare (1996) and Markusen and 
Venables (1999).
2  MNEs, instead, will benefit from vertical spillovers since they reach 
upstream suppliers and downstream clients, and loss from horizontal externalities since 
they flow to their direct competitors. Therefore, foreign firms will try to minimize 
outflows of specific knowledge while encouraging outflows of generic knowledge to 
complementary sectors. Despite this well acknowledged theoretical wisdom, there is 
little conclusive evidence supporting these claims. 
 
Existing evidence on whether there are spillovers is of three types.
3 First of all, there are 
case studies and surveys, which offer a variety of qualitative information on specific 
FDI projects and locations, which however can hardly be generalised. Steward (1976), 
Crone and Watts (2000), Brand, Hill and Munday (2000), Turok (1993), Driffield and 
Noor (1999) and Pavlinek and Smith (1998) all carry out this type of analysis. Only the 
latter concerns CEECs. Although they focus on different countries and economic 
sectors, they found little or no evidence of backward linkages between MNEs and 
domestic firms. The second group consists of industry-level studies.  Recent examples 
of this type of studies are Gorg and Strobl (2002) and Altomonte and Resmini (2002). 
The former focuses on the Irish manufacturing sector while the latter concerns the 
Polish manufacturing sector. Both conclude that the entry of a new MNE positively 
affect domestic firms. However, the causal meaning of this correlation is not clear, as 
discussed also in Aitken and Harrison (1999). Inward FDI may raise host country 
productivity not only because it generates spillovers, but simply because foreign firms 
are generally speaking more productive than domestic firms or because they tend to 
concentrate in the more productive industries and their presence forces less productive 
domestic firms to exit the market. The third type of studies is micro-level analyses.  
These studies examine whether the productivity of domestic firms is affected by the 
presence of foreign firms. Both intra-industry and inter-industry spillovers are 
considered, while geographical proximity between domestic and foreign firms is not 
always included into the analysis. Djankov and Hoeckman (2000), Smarzynska Javornic 
                                                 
2 See Glass et al. (2000) for an in-depth survey of these and other theoretical literature concerning 
spillovers between domestic and foreign firms. 
3 Gorg and Greenaway (2002), Alfaro and Rodriguez Clare (2003), and UNECE (2001) extensively 
document empirical evidence on spillovers generated by foreign firms. Only the latter focuses on CEECs.    4
(2004), Haskel et al. (2002), Peri and Urban (2004), Judaeva et al. (2003), Schoor and 
van der Tol (2002) and Konings (2001) represent recent examples of this kind of 
studies.  Most of them fail to find evidence on positive spillovers, especially in the case 
of developing countries. As far as CEECs are concerned, Djankov and Hoeckman 
(2000) document negative spillovers in the Czech Republic while Schoor and van der 
Tol (2002) highlight the existence of positive vertical spillovers in Hungary; Konings 
(2000) found negative spillovers in Bulgaria and Romania and no spillovers in Poland, 
while Smarzynska Javornic (2004) provides evidence of positive vertical spillovers in 
Lituania and Judaeva et al. (2003) document positive intra-industry spillovers but 
negative inter-industry spillovers between foreign firms and domestic firms in Russia. 
The message coming from these and other studies on spillovers is that the focus, the 
data and the methods used may affect the results, as suggested by Gorg and Strobl 
(2001).  
 
Our paper contributes to this literature in several ways. We investigate both horizontal 
and vertical effects. The latter have been analysed by considering not only contacts 
between domestic suppliers of intermediate inputs and their multinational customers, 
but also contacts between foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs to their domestic 
clients. The net effect of FDI, therefore, depends on the sign and the magnitude of 
horizontal, vertical-backward and vertical-forward linkages. We estimate the impact of 
these three channels for spillovers on the productivity of domestic firms by using a firm 
level database, which increases the accuracy of the results. We control for selection bias 
and endogeneity by adopting the semiparametric estimation method suggested by Olley 
and Pakes (1996). Finally, we test whether intra and inter-sectoral spillovers depend on 
the one hand on host country’s social capabilities and absorptive capacity, and, on the 
other hand, on the technological content of the production of the foreign affiliates, both 
in absolute terms and relatively to the domestic firms of the host country.   
 
We arrive at a number of interesting conclusions. We found evidence of positive 
externalities, which are more likely to be exploited by the most productive domestic 
firms. This result is in line with previous studies highlighting the importance of 
absorptive capacity. Less productive firms, however, can partially compensate their   5
productivity gap and, therefore, reap some spillovers, by locating in the capital regions. 
Spillovers may occur both within and across sectors. Finally, both high tech and low 
tech foreign firms are able to generate positive spillovers, though with a different 
intensity. However, domestic firms can more easily take advantage from spillovers 
emanating from low tech foreign firms, while high tech MNEs are able to exert a 
significant impact on domestic firms’ performance only in presence of a large 
technological gap, as it happens in Bulgaria. The Polish experience, instead, suggests 
that when the technological gap between foreign and domestic firms is very narrow, 
spillovers are barely significant.   
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our data and the 
empirical strategy we adopt to answer the above mentioned research questions. In 
section 3 we describe the results of our estimations. The final section summarizes main 
results and concludes.  
 
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
The data used in this study constitute an unbalanced panel with annual information on 
more than 40,000 domestic manufacturing firms and about 10,000 foreign owned firms 
located in three transition countries, namely Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania.
4  Although 
they started with very similar technological levels and managerial skills, their transition 
towards market economy followed very different patterns and today Poland is a member 
of the European Union, while Bulgaria and Romania still have the status of candidate 
countries. The development of transition phase has affected the inflows of FDI 
(Resmini, 2000), which have responded positively to the structural reforms undertaken 
in Poland and negatively to the stagnation of the reform process in Bulgaria and 
Romania. Consequently, Poland has become very soon one of the most important FDI 
recipients in the area, while Bulgaria and Romania fail in attracting a consistent stock of 
foreign capitals. Given our research objectives, these and other socio-economic 
characteristics make the comparison of these three countries interesting.  
                                                 
4 From a temporal perspective, it covers the period from 1995 to 2003, although for Bulgaria the analysis 
is restricted to more recent years (1998-2003) due to data availability.   6
The data come from the Amadeus database published by Bureau Van Djik. In addition 
to standard financial information it gives details on several qualitative variables, such as 
ownership characteristics, industry classification and the geographical location within 
countries. Although it seems to be a common practice to classify a firm as domestic, 
even in the absence of any information on the nationality of the ownership (Peri and 
Urban, 2004), we prefer to adopt a more restrictive strategy in order to avoid to 
overestimate the possible impact of foreign firms on domestic firm performance
5. Firms 
with a share of foreign ownership exceeding 10 per cent have been classified as foreign 
affiliates, following the definition provided by the OECD and the IMF. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the most important facts and figures concerning domestic and 
foreign firms in the above mentioned countries. In particular, fourth facts are worth of 
notice.  
First of all, the capital regions account for a large proportion of both domestic and 
foreign firms. It ranges from 17-32 per cent for domestic firms and from 21-52% for 
foreign firms. Sofia region accounts for the largest percentages in both cases.
6 Secondly, 
most of FDI undertaken in the above mentioned countries belong to low tech sectors. 
The share of this kind of FDI ranges from 68% of Poland to 87% of Romania where the 
distribution of foreign firms between high and low tech sectors is quite similar to that of 
domestic firms. These asymmetries may create some problems in the estimation of the 
impact of FDI on domestic firms. On the one hand, spillovers may be limited to the 
capital regions, given the high concentration of foreign firms located there. On the other 
hand, the large presence of foreign firms in traditional labour intensive sectors – such as 
textiles, clothing, footwear, furniture, etc. – may reduce the scope for technology 
transfer to the foreign affiliates. Consequently, spillovers to domestic firms may be 
small or non-existing, regardless of ability of domestic firms to reap them.  
The examination of the estimated productivity levels, reported at the bottom of Table 1, 
highlights other interesting features. First of all, Polish firms are the most productive of 
                                                 
5 This restrictive strategy prevents us from including in the sample other countries, such as Hungary or 
Czech Republic.  
6 Since the Amadeus dataset is based on balance sheet data, one may argue that this phenomenon might 
reflect the location of headquarters rather than production plants. However, these results are consistent 
with other studies on the location of MNEs in the CEECs, based on other database recording production 
plants, only.  See Altomonte and Resmini (2001) and Pusterla and Resmini (2005).    7
the sample, while the least productive locate in Bulgaria. Therefore, we expect that the 
technological gap between domestic and foreign firms is larger in Bulgaria than in 
Poland. Secondly, the capital regions host the most productive firms, regardless of the 
nationality of the ownership. Thirdly, and more importantly, Table 1 shows that foreign 
firms are on average more productive than domestic firms. However, when we control 
for the manufacturing sector they belong to, this is not necessarily true. Polish low tech 
foreign firms are more productive than foreign firms, while the productivity gap 
between low tech foreign firms and Romania low tech foreign firms is very narrow. We 
wonder how spillovers might occur in these cases.  
In what follows, we will try to understand whether and to what extent these striking 
features may condition the distribution of spillovers across countries and their 
exploitation by domestic firms. In doing so, we will cast a new light on the spillovers 
and FDI topic.   
 
 (insert table 1 about here) 
 
2.1 The empirical strategy  
Our aim is to detect whether and to what extent foreign firms have affected the 
performance of domestic firms.  Following the most recent literature, we have then 
constructed an appropriate measure for productivity at firm level. 
We measured each domestic firm’s total factor productivity (TFP) as the residual of a 
two-factor Cobb-Douglas production function.
7 Following the approach most 
commonly used by the recent literature on the topic, we apply the semi parametric 
estimation technique developed by Olley and Pakes (1996). This technique takes into 
account the simultaneity bias due to the endogeneity of the firm’s input selection, which 
may arise if a firm responds to unobservable productivity shocks by adjusting its input 
choice. This would imply a correlation between the inputs and the error term, which 
biases traditional OLS coefficient estimates. Olley and Pakes suggest as a solution to 
                                                 
7  Total factor productivity at firm level has been estimated using turnover as a proxy for total output, the 
stock of tangible fixed assets as a proxy for physical capital and number of employees. We lack industry 
specific deflators, thus financial data are expressed in thousands of US dollars. This implies that TFP 
might also capture price and demand shocks (De Loecker, 2005) and that we cannot exclude that MNEs’ 
impact on domestic firms’ performance affect prices rather than real productivity. Most of studies 
focusing on CEECs do not explicitly consider this potential distortion (Tydell and Yudaeva, 2005). We 
do it in the second step of our empirical analysis, as it is explained later on.    8
this problem the use of firm’s investment decisions as a proxy for unobserved 
productivity shock
8. We also estimate TFP using ordinary least squares, in order to 
assess the magnitude of the simultaneity bias.
9 We estimate the production function for 
each 2 digit NACE manufacturing sector separately. Due to the small number of 
observations in some sectors, we are forced to drop manufacturing of refined petroleum 
products (Nace 23) and recycling (Nace 37)
10.  
 
Once estimated TFP at firm level, we explore the role played by MNEs as a determinant 
of domestic firms’ performance, measured in term of TFP.  
In order to achieve this objective, we need to find appropriate measures for foreign firm 
penetration at both sector and region level. A standard measure of foreign presence that 
also reflects the likely local nature of spillovers is the number of foreign firms in sector 
i, region r at time t-1 ( fdiirt-1). This rough measure of FDI density has been then 
interacted with factors able to explain both the degree of interdependence of 
manufacturing sectors, as well as the nature – i.e. source for inputs or destination for 
output – of such interdependence. Both these characteristics can be inferred from input-
output tables, which suggest us that each manufacturing sector is at the same time both 
a supplier and a customer of several manufacturing sectors, itself included.
11  In order to 
take into account this complexity, we have considered the following four measures for 




αij * fdijrt-1           ( 1 )  
HOR_SPILLit
S =αii * fdiirt-1         (2) 
F_SPILLit = ∑
≠i j
ωij * fdijr-1t         ( 3 )  
HOR_SPILLit
C = ωii * fdiirt-1         ( 4 )  
 
                                                 
8 Alternatively, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest that material inputs may be a better proxy for the 
firm’s reaction to productivity shocks.  
9 Results are not shown, but they are available upon requests.  
10 For Romania we have a larger sample, which allows us to estimate TFP for all sectors.  
11 We use Input Output table at two digit level for all countries. However, they refer to different years, 
namely 1997 for Bulgaria, 2000 for Poland and 1998 in the case of Romania.   9
B_SPILLit and F_SPILLit measure foreign firm penetration in industries from which 
industry  i’s domestic firms source (sell) their inputs (output), thus accounting for 
vertical-backward and vertical-forward spillovers, respectively.    ij α ( ij ω ) is the share of 





it, instead, represent the foreign presence 
in the same sector as the domestic firms, weighted by the share of sector i total output 
(input) supplied (sold) to itself. Therefore, the two variables account for possible 
horizontal spillovers. While the coefficients taken by the input output tables remain 
fixed over time, the number of foreign firms operating in each sector changes. Hence, 
the variables capturing horizontal and vertical spillovers are time-varying sector-
specific variables.  
 
As stated in the introduction, horizontal spillovers are likely to involve sector specific 
technological knowledge, thus it is likely that foreign firms dislike them as they are 
supposed to benefit domestic competitors. However, since knowledge is a public good, 
multinational firms can not avoid it spills over domestic firms through imitation, 
training, demonstration effects as well as input-output linkages.
12  Vertical spillovers, 
both backward and forward, concern general technical knowledge and may be favoured 
by foreign firms, which have an incentive in contracting with more efficient upstream 
and downstream firms. Therefore, while the sign of horizontal spillovers is almost 
unpredictable, vertical spillovers are likely to show a positive sign. 
  
We control for two important regressors. First of all, we need to account for the 
relevance of the absorptive capacity of domestic firms. As several previous studies 
suggested, it is necessary for domestic firms to have enough absorptive capacity in 
order to be able to capture the spillovers generated by multinational enterprises.  In 
order to account for this important effect, we construct a technology gap variable. It has 
been defined as the difference between the average TFP of sector i in region r at time t, 
and the TFP of firm k in the same sector, region and year (Jabbour Mucchielli, 2005).
13  
                                                 
12 Since we use two digit industries to define sectors, some vertical spillovers may occur within sectors 
too.  
13 Foreign firms have been excluded from this calculation in order to not introduce any multicollinearity 
in the estimations.    10
Then we create a firm specific, time varying dummy variable (GAPkt) taking the value 
of 1 if firm k’s  TFP is below the industry average, and 0 otherwise. This dummy 
variable has been interacted with spillover variables. This allows us to identify separate 
effects for the less productive firms and the more productive ones, respectively.  
Secondly, we include a measure for product market competition. The idea that FDI can 
create competitive pressure on host country’s domestic firms has been discussed both at 
theoretical and empirical level (Markusen and Venables, 1999; Blomstrom et al., 2001; 
Haskel et al., 2002; Aitken and Harrison, 1999). Needless to say, these competitive 
pressures may induce adjustments in domestic firms’ performance, especially if it is 
proxied by a not properly deflated measure of TFP (De Loecker, 2004). Since this is our 
case, we include in the set of the explanatory variables a measure for firm’s pricing 
power (MARKUPkt), computed as operational turnover minus employment costs over 
operational turnover. Its interpretation is very simple: the greater the difference between 
revenues and variable costs (proxied by labour costs) the greater power firms have to set 
prices, the less competitive is the market.
14  This variable should capture the impact of 
price adjustments to firms’ performance. Therefore, we expect it to have a positive sign.  
 
Our baseline specification, therefore, consists in the following two equations: 
 




ikt + β3 GAPkt*B_SPILL
S
irt +  
   + β4 GAPkt*HOR_SPILL
S
irt +  β5 MARKUPkt+αr + αt + αi + εkirt   (5) 
 







   + γ4 GAPkt*HOR_SPILL
C
irt + γ5 MARKUPkt + δr +  δt + δi + ηkirt (6) 
 
Eq. (5) accounts for spillover effects generated by multinational firms operating in 
upstream sectors, while eq. (6) captures spillover effects emanating from multinational 
enterprises operating in downstream sectors. This estimation approach helps us to 
separately evaluate the magnitude of respectively forward and backward linkages both 
across but also within sectors. This strategy implies that the net effect of foreign on 
                                                 
14 This index represents is a proxy for the Lerner index. Therefore, it ranges from zero (perfect 
competition) to one (monopoly).    11
domestic firms’ productivity can be obtained by jointly evaluating the estimated βs of 
eq. (5) with the corresponding γs in eq. (6).
15  
 
Given the panel structure of the dataset, we estimate these equations using random 
effect models for the three countries separately. These allow us to account for the 
unobservable heterogeneity and to control for unobserved time invariant factors at firm, 
sector, and region level which might affect domestic firms’ performance.
16 Finally, we 
include also time dummies in order to take into account the deep transformations which 
have characterised most of manufacturing sectors during the transition phase.  
 
 
3. Estimation Results 
 
In this section we present and discuss empirical estimates of spillovers emanating from 
foreign firms on domestic firms’ TFP. We first focus on the estimations of eq. (5) and 
(6), then discuss whether and to what extent the geographical concentration of FDI in 
the capital regions is able to condition the general results. Finally, we explore whether 
and to what extent the concentration of FDI in low tech manufacturing sectors limit the 
generation of spillovers from foreign to domestic firms.  
 
3.1 The baseline model 
Table 2 shows the results of estimating eq. (5) and eq. (6) for Bulgaria, Poland and 
Romania. Overall, the results confirm, on the one hand, the importance of the absorptive 
capacity of local firms and, on the other hand, the non-automaticness of spillovers 
generated by MNEs. Only the more productive firms, in fact, seem to be able to benefit 
from spillovers emanating from multinational enterprises. Both specific and generic 
                                                 
15 This estimation strategy is quite different from previous studies, where similar backward and forward 
measures for spillovers are simultaneously estimated (Smarzynska Javornic, 2004; Schoor and van der 
Tol, 2002). However, it seems to us the best way to proceed, given the high levels of pairwise correlations 
among spillover variables (see table A.1 in the appendix)  
16 Needless to say, we estimate fixed effects models, too.  Both models provide estimates which are very 
similar to each other in terms of both the significance and the signs of the estimated coefficients. For that 
reason, we decide to show random effect results only, though they sometime are not supported by 
statistics. In particular, the Hausman test indicate that Random effects explain what happens in Poland 
better than fixed effects, while the opposite occurs for Bulgaria. As far as Romania is concerned, random 
effect models are acceptable in most of specifications. Results are available from the authors upon 
request.    12
knowledge spill over domestic firms, though with different intensity. The estimated 
coefficients for vertical spillovers are larger than those for horizontal spillovers in all 
countries. However, foreign firms exert the highest impact on Bulgarian firms and the 
lowest one on Romanian firms.  
Less productive firms, instead, can not benefit from FDI regardless of the country they 
belong to. The estimated coefficients for the spillover variables are negative and 
significant at the conventional levels.
 17  This indicates that the technological delay is so 
huge that it prevents this type of domestic firms for reaping any kind of knowledge 
brought into their respective countries by MNEs. The latter, therefore, has seen as 
“cathedrals in the desert” by this group of firms.  
 
As far as the other variables are concerned, the coefficients of the capital dummies are 
positive but significant in the case of Romania only, where, however, its inclusion does 
not change either the sign or the magnitude of the spillover coefficients. This indicates 
that the capital regions are not able to affect the location of more productive domestic 
firms within each country. Their role is completely different, as it will be discussed in 
the next section. The mark up variable is positive in all specification but significant in 
the case of Romania only.  
 
(insert table 2 about here) 
 
3.2 Is the location in the capital region an ‘atou’? 
In order to understand whether and to what extent being located in the capital region 
represents an advantage in term of capacity to reap spillovers generated by MNEs, we 
interact the capital dummy with the spillover variables. Results for the relevant 
variables are shown in table 3.  
Generally speaking, less productive domestic firms located outside the capital regions 
suffer from the presence of MNEs, as indicated by the negative and significant 
coefficients of the spillover variables. Those located in the capital regions, instead, can 
                                                 
17 Given the way spillover variables have been built up, the coefficients of the interacted variables 
indicate by how much the slope coefficients of the less productive firms differ from the slope coefficients 
of the more productive firms. Since the differential slope coefficients are negative and larger than 
coefficients of spillover variables for more productive firms, we can conclude that on average less 
productive firms do not reap any externalities from MNEs.    13
reduce this negative impact and sometimes benefit from some spillovers, both vertical 
and horizontal such as in Bulgaria and Romania, or horizonatal only, as in the case of 
Romania. Overall, these results indicate the location in the capital region allows less 
productive domestic firms to mitigate the negative impact exerted by MNEs and, in 
some cases, to reap part of the knowledge brought into the region by the multinational 
firms. Urbanization externalities, therefore, might partially compensate the lack of 
technological capabilities of firms.  
The evidence for the more productive firms is less clear. Outside the capital regions, we 
found evidence of both vertical and horizontal spillovers. In Romania, however, the 
evidence for the transfer of specific knowledge sensibly weakens, since the marginal 
impact of horizontal spillovers on domestic firms’ performance is very close to zero. 
Differently from what happens in case of the less productive firms, the location around 
the capital city does not represent an advantage for the more productive firms. Pro-
competitive effects clearly emerge in Poland and Bulgaria, while in Romania some 
vertical spillovers accrue to domestic firms. Overall these results indicates that 
horizontal spillovers are more likely to occur outside the capital regions, where the 
concentration of the most productive firms may reduce the scope for reaping 
externalities generated by MNEs. 
(insert tables 3 about here) 
 
3.3. Are all foreign firms able to generate spillovers? 
The last topic we want to explore is whether foreign firm characteristics affect the 
transmission of spillovers on the domestic firms. In particular, we explore whether 
foreign affiliates with a different technology intensity are able to exert the same impact 
on domestic firms’ performance. To achieve this goal, we consider two types of foreign 
firms, namely firms operating in high tech sectors and firms operating in traditional 
labour intensive sectors.
18  Then we recalculate the FDI penetration variable (fdiijt) in 
order to take into account this difference. Needless to say, we expect that the more the 
density of FDI in technologically advanced sectors the higher the probability of 
generating spillovers.  
                                                 
18 The classification of manufacturing sectors in low and high tech ones is presented in table A.2 in the 
appendix.    14
Table 4 shows the results for the three considered countries. Generally speaking, they 
confirm our hypothesis. The impact on domestic firms’ performance of high tech 
foreign firms is larger than that exerted by low tech foreign affiliates, as indicated by the 
magnitude of the estimated coefficients of spillover variables. However, this impact is 
not necessarily positive.  
In Bulgaria, only more productive domestic firms succeed in reaping positive 
externalities emanating from both high tech and low tech foreign firms. As before, less 
productive domestic firms are not able to take advantage from the presence of foreign 
firms, with the exception of some horizontal spillovers emanated by high tech foreign 
firms.  
The empirical evidence in Poland is less clear. We found that horizontal and vertical-
spillovers take place between low tech foreign firms and more productive domestic 
firms.. On the contrary, high tech foreign firms do not seem to be able to benefit Polish 
firms, with the exception of some horizontal spillovers and vertical backward 
externalities accruing to less productive domestic firms.  
As far as Romania is concerned, we observe that both low tech and high tech foreign 
firms generate positive spillovers for the more productive domestic firms. Vertical 
spillovers are more intense than horizontal one in both cases. Less productive firms are 
instead unable to catch-up their technological delay through spillovers, as indicated by 
the differential slope coefficients, which are negative, larger and statistically different 
from those of more productive firms.  
 
Overall these results indicate that low tech foreign firms are more likely to benefit 
domestic firms in Central and Eastern Europe, provided that they have the necessary 
level of absorptive capacity. Although they are able to generate both kinds of spillovers, 
the impact of generic knowledge is more intense than that of specific knowledge. Quite 
surprisingly, high tech foreign firms exert some positive effects on firms’ performance 
only when the technological gap with the domestic firms is very high. This result is 
consistent with previous studies, (Peri and Urban, 2004).  
 
(insert Table 4  about here) 
   15
4. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper we tried to answer three questions concerning the effects of FDI on 
domestic firms’ performance in three CEECs, namely Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. 
We provided an answer, though not definite, to all of them.  
First of all, we demonstrated that MNEs are able to positively affect domestic firms’ 
performance. However, only more productive domestic firms can reap these benefits. It 
is a reassuring result which confirms the importance of the absorptive capacity as a 
determinant of productivity spillovers. Secondly, we found evidence of both horizontal 
and vertical-backward and vertical-forward spillovers generated by both high and low 
tech foreign firms. Generally speaking, spillovers emanating from high tech foreign 
firms are stronger than those generated by low tech multinational enterprises.  
These general results, however, uncover a very mixed picture not only across countries, 
but also within countries, when we control for the location within or outside the capital 
regions.  
In particular, we found that flows of specific knowledge are more diffuse outside the 
capital regions, though they accrue to the more productive firms only. In the capital 
regions, pro-competitive effects are more likely to occur, and unfortunately they are 
barely compensated by flows of generic knowledge across complementary sectors. Less 
productive firms located in Warsaw and Sofia regions are able to reap both horizontal 
and vertical spillovers, while Romania firms located around Bucharest benefit from 
flows of specific knowledge only. Overall, these results indicate that urbanization 
externalities, making firms more effective, might mitigate the technology gap thus 
allowing less efficient firms to take advantage from the presence of foreign firms. This 
is a novelty in the panorama of similar previous studies and deserves further analysis.  
As far as foreign firms’ heterogeneity is concerned, we found that domestic firms 
respond differently to externalities emanating from low and high tech foreign firms. 
Again, the results confirm the inability of less productive firms to reap spillovers 
regardless of what type of foreign firms we are considering. To this respect, a noticeable 
exception is represented by Polish and, though to a lesser extent, Bulgarian less 
productive firms, which are able to benefit from horizontal externalities emanating from 
high tech foreign firms.    16
High tech foreign firms, instead, benefit more productive domestic firms in Bulgaria 
and Romania, but not in Poland. However, while in Bulgaria flows of specific 
knowledge are more intense than those of generic knowledge, the opposite happens in 
Romania. 
Although the present work uses the same database for three different transition 
countries, the variety of results obtained makes any generalisation difficult. Overall, our 
results indicate that the mechanism through which FDI affects domestic firms’ total 
factor productivity is still poorly understood and thus need further researches.  
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Table 1 – Domestic and foreign firms in the transition countries  
domestic foreign domestic foreign domestic foreign
n of firms 2623 1159 4526 1502 33970 7165
of which: 
in the capital region 827 608 755 322 6098 1771
outside the capital region 1796 551 3771 1180 27872 5394
low tech sectors 1977 979 3304 1027 30236 6206
high tech sectors 646 180 1222 475 3734 959
Estimated Productivity index (averages):
all sample  2.660 3.342 4.660 4.885 3.163 3.459
in the capital region 2.804 3.646 5.212 5.039 3.529 3.887
outside the capital region 2.584 2.941 4.585 4.849 3.102 3.339
low tech sectors 2.604 3.198 4.882 4.763 3.674 3.749
high tech sectors 2.865 4.129 4.146 5.147 3.099 3.417
Bulgaria Poland Romania
 
Own calculations on AMADEUS database. Productivity indexes have been computed as simple mean 
of TFP (in log form) of firms belonging to the same country. TFP at firm level has been estimated with 
Olley and Pakes (1996) semiparametric procedure, as described in the text. 
  
Table 2 - The baseline models: Bulgaria 
 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Supplier sectors
Horizontal linkages .027    (.0110)
b .028    (.0108)
a .011   (.0030)
a .011   (.0027)
a  .005    (.0002)
a  .005    (.0001)
a
Backword linkages  .162   (.0218)
a  .165   (.0209)
a  .062   (.0098)
a  .064   (.0067)
a  .012    (.0004)
a  .012   (.0004)
a
tech gap * Hor linkages -.072   (.0064)
a -.072   (.0064)
a - .017   (.0016)
a - .017   (.0016)
a -.010   (.0001)
a -.010   (.0001)
a
tech gap *Back linkages -.275   (.0099)
a -.275  (.0099)
a -.091   (.0034)
a -.090   (.0034)
a -.027   (.0003)
a -.027    (.0003)
a
markup .588   (.0188)
a .591   (.0188)
a .000   (.0001) .000   (.0001) .172   (.0036)
a .173  (.0036)a
capital  -  .066   (.0696) -  .025   (.0698) -  .335   (.0154)
a
sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
region dummies yes - yes - yes -
time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes
firm dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
n. of obs 5826 5826 5837 5837 91429 91429
R square 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.82 0.43 0.43
Client sectors
Horizontal linkages .034    (.0085)
a .035   (.0081)
a .011   (.0026)
a .012   (.0022)
a  .004    (.0001)
a  .005    (.0001)
a
Forward linkages  .109   (.0151)
a   .112   (.0144)
a  .044   (.0080)
a  .051   (.0060)
a .011   (.0004)
a .012    (.0004)
a
tech gap * Hor linkages -.070   (.0038)
a -.070    (.0038)
a - .018   (.0013)
a - .018   (.0013)
a -.009   (.0001)
a -.008   (.0001)
a
tech gap *For linkages -.161    (.0063)
a -.161    (.0063)
a -.076   (.0031)
a -.076   (.0031)
a -.028    (.0003)
a -.028    (.0003)
a
markup .599   (.0189)
a .602   (.0188)
a .000   (.0001) .000   (.0001) .169  (.0036)
a .169  (.0036)
a
capital  - .005    (.0768) -  .051    (.0716) - .344    (.0156)
a
sector dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
region dummies yes - yes - yes -
time dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes
firm dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
n. of obs 5826 5826 5837 5837 91429 91429
R square 0.75 0.74 0.81 0.81 0.46 0.46
Bulgaria Poland Romania
 
Standard error in parenthesis; a, b, c denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level.  
 Table 3 – The role of the capital city 
 
Bulgaria  capital Rest of the country capital Rest of the country
Supplier sectors
Horizontal linkages .151   (.0170)
a -.202  (.0156)
a - .087  (.0255)
a .104  (.0196)
a
Backward linkages  .153   (.0243)
a -.405   (.0218)
a   .002   (.0293) .159   (.0325)
a
n. of obs:       5826
R square:      0.77
Client sectors
Horizontal linkages .123   (.0115)
a -.180   (.0107)
a -.060   (.0161)
a .084   (.0194)
a
Forward linkages  .168   (0173)
a -.305  (.0160)
a -.091   (.0271)
a  .189   (.0321)
a
n. of obs:       5826
R square:      0.77
Poland capital Rest of the country capital Rest of the country
Supplier sectors
Horizontal linkages .025  (.0033)
a -.035  (.0027)
a -.015   (.0040)
a .022 (.0039)
a
Backward linkages .040  (.0072)
a -.101   (.0042)
a -.019  (.0085)
b .071   (.0075)
a
n. of obs: 5873
R square: 0.82
Client sectors
Horizontal linkages .022   (.0026)
a -.033   (.0022)
a -.013   (.0032)
a .023 (.0032)
a
Forward linkages .050   (.0064)
a -.092   (.0038)
a -.023   (.0076)
a .059   (.0067)
a
n. of obs:    5873
R square:    0.82
Romania capital Rest of the country capital Rest of the country
Supplier sectors
Horizontal linkages .008 (.0002)
a -.013   (.0001)
a -.004 (.0002)
a .008  (.0002)
a
Backward linkages -.004   (.0006)
a -.026   (.0003)
a .007 (.0006)
a .011   (.0004)
a
n. of obs:    91429
R square:    0.45
Client sectors
Horizontal linkages .006  (.0002)
a -.011  (.0001)
a -.003   (.0002)
a .007  (.0002)
a
Forward linkages .006 (.0005)
a -.030   (.0003)
a .002   (.0005)
a .012    (.0005)
a
n. of obs:   91429
R square:   0.41
Less productive domestic firm More productive domestic firm
Less productive domestic firms More productive domestic firms
Less productive domestic firm More productive domestic firm
 
Standard error in parenthesis; a, b, c denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. Other regressors are competition 
control variable as well as firm, sector and time specific effects, as explained in the text.  
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Table 4 – High Tech vs. Low Tech foreign firms 
 
Bulgaria high tech low tech high tech low tech
Supplier sectors
Horizontal linkages -1.069 (.1730)




Backward linkages -.389 (.0235)




n. of obs: 5842
R square: 0.76
Client sectors
Horizontal linkages -.319   (.0905)
a -.070   (.0038)
a .337   (.1125)
a .034 (.0084)
a
Forward linkages -.381 (.0272)
a -.122   (.0079)a .232 (.0637)
a .079   (.0154)
a
n. of obs: 5842
R square: 0.76
Poland  high tech low tech high tech low tech
Supplier sectors
Horizontal linkages .167   (.0366)
a -.031   (.0030)
a -.062 (.0520) .022 (.0052)
a
Backward linkages .080   (.0200)
a -.220  (.0116)
a -.012   (.0316) .157 (.0222)
a
n. of obs: 5873
R square: 0.81
Client sectors
Horizontal linkages -.046   (.0141)
a -.032   (.0025)
a .034   (.0208)c .025 (.0046)
a
Forward linkages -.071  (.0152)
a -.104 (.0075)
a .032   (.0220) .109   (.0158)
a
n. of obs: 5873
R square: 0.80 
Romania high tech low tech high tech low tech
Supplier sectors
Horizontal linkages -.028   (.0016)
a -.009   (.0001)
a .001  (.0018) .004  (.0002)
a
Backward linkages -.089   (.0015)
a -.018   (.0003)
a .037   (.0020)
a .007  (.0004)
a
n. of obs:  91429
R square: 0.45
Client sectors
Horizontal linkages -.034   (.0019)
a -.008   (.0001)
a .007   (.0022)a .004 (.0001)
a
Forward linkages -.085  (.0019)




n. of obs:  91429
R square: 0.47
Less productive domestic firm More productive domestic firm
Less productive domestic firm More productive domestic firm
Less productive domestic firm More productive domestic firm
 
Standard error in parenthesis; a, b, c denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level. Other regressors are 
competition control variable as well as firm, sector and time specific effects, as explained in the text. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 Spillover variables: correlation matrix 
 
  HOR_SPILL
S B_SPILL  HOR_SPILL
C F_SPILL 
HOR_SPILL
S  BG: 1.00 
PL:  1.00 
RO: 1.00 
    
B_SPILL




















RO:  - .07
** 
BG: 1.00 
PL:  1.00 
RO: 1.00 
 
F_SPILL  BG: - .19
** 
PL:  - .054
** 















PL:  1.00 
RO: 1.00 




Table A.2. Classification of Manufacturing Industries (Nace Rev. 1 codes in parenthesis) 
 
High-Technology Industries  Low-Technology  industry 
Aircrafts and Spacecrafts (353)   Building and repair of ships and boats (351)  
Office, accounting and computing  
machinery (30)  
Rubber and plastic products (25)  
Radio, TV and communications equipment (32)   Coke, refined petroleum products  
and nuclear fuel(23)  
Medical, precision and optical instruments (33)  Other non-metallic mineral products (26)  
Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (31)   Basic metals and fabricated metal products (27-28) 
Motor Vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (34)   Manufacturing n.e.c., recycling (36-37)  
Chemicals (excluding pharmaceuticals) (24)   Wood, pulp, paper prod., printing and publishing (20-22) 
Railroad and transport equipment (352, 353, 354)   Food products, beverages and tobacco (15-16)  
Machinery and equipments n.e.c. (29)   Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear (17-19)  
 
 